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Flight delays are primarily due to traffic imbalances caused by the demand for 
airspace resource exceeding its capacity. The capacity restriction might be due to 
inclement weather, an overloaded air traffic sector, or an airspace restriction. The 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the organization responsible for air traffic 
control and management in the USA, has developed several tools known as Traffic 
Management Initiatives (TMI) to bring the demand into compliance with the capacity 
constraints. Collaborative Trajectory Option Program (CTOP) is one such tool that 
has been developed by the FAA to mitigate the delay experienced by flights. 
Operating under a Collaborative Decision Making (CDM) environment, CTOP is 
considered as the next step into the future of air traffic management by the FAA. The 
advantages of CTOP over the traditional the TMIs are unequivocal. The concerns 
about the allocation scheme used in the CTOP and treatment of flights from the flight 
operators/airlines have limited its usage. This research was motivated by the high 
ground delays that were experienced by flights and how the rerouting decisions were 
  
made in the current allocation method used in a CTOP. We have proposed four 
alternative approaches in this thesis, which incorporated priority of flights by the 
respective flight operator, aimed at not merely reducing an individual flight operator’s 
delay but also the total delay incurred to the system. We developed a test case 
scenario to compare the performances of the four proposed allocation methods 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
Aviation operations are supported by one of the most complex transportation systems in the 
world. The complex nature of the system is attributed to the number of aircraft, extensive 
network of airports, number of passengers, complexity in quantifying the airspace volume, 
safety concerns, and the number of controlling entities, which makes scheduling of the aircraft 
of profound importance. The determination of the National Airspace System (NAS) capacity is 
complex. NAS capacity depends on many factors, such as meteorological conditions, 
passenger demand, socio-economic trend information (changes in demographics, income, 
market power, and other factors), airport capacity, and fleet mix (Ball et al., 2007). The 
numerous factors in estimating the NAS capacity and large variations in performance and 
efficiency lead to large uncertainty in the aviation environment. 
 
Figure 1: On-time Arrival Performance National (BTS USDOT, 2018) 
Flight delays are primarily a result of the traffic imbalance caused by the demand for airspace 




flights arrived at its destination over 15 minutes late and from Figure 2, about a third of these 
late arrivals were a direct result of the inability of the NAS to handle the traffic demands that 
were placed upon it. Capacity reduction in the NAS occurs due to a wide number of reasons, 
including adverse weather conditions, an airspace restriction such as a Temporary Flight 
Restriction (TFR), or due to an overloaded air traffic control sector. The reason that demand 
exceeds capacity is a constraint of some kind. To bring the demand into compliance with the 
capacity constraints and mitigate the delays, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the 
organization responsible for air traffic control and management in the USA, has created 
several tools known as Traffic Management Initiatives (TMI). Some of the main TMIs 
developed for this purpose are Ground Delay Program (GDP), Airspace Flow Program (AFP), 
Ground Stops (GS), and Miles-in-Trail (MIT). Despite the planning efforts and a wide range 
of TMIs developed by the FAA, the flights still experience delays because of the complex 
dynamic nature of the system and uncertainty involved in the flights’ schedules. To further 
improve the performance of these TMIs, the FAA adopted Collaborative Decision Making 
(CDM). CDM is an operating paradigm, initiated by the FAA to improve Air Traffic Flow 
Management (ATFM) through increased collaboration between airspace users and Air 
Navigation Service Providers (ANSP). The functional goals of CDM are to create a better 
knowledge base and a common situational awareness by sharing information to both ANSP 





Figure 2: Delays Cause by Year, Percent of Total Delay Minutes (BTS USDOT, 2018) 
TMIs like GDP and AFP have been incorporated under the CDM paradigm. A GDP is aimed 
at controlling arrivals into a capacitated NAS element by issuing delays to flights at their 
departure airports (ground delays) to avoid overloading the capacitated element i.e. airports. 
An AFP is designed similarly, but to control the traffic flow through a Flow Constrained Area 
(FCA); FCAs are geometric descriptions of the regions of constrained capacity. When an AFP 
assigns ground delays to flights that were scheduled to pass through an FCA, the flight 
operators are then given an option to either take the ground delay assigned or to reroute the 
flight around the FCA. In 2007, the FAA developed a new TMI tool under the CDM 
paradigm, allowing for more input and flexibility from flight operators in the way that 
constraints are handled. Initially, the new tool was known as System Enhancements for 
Versatile Electronic Negotiation (SEVEN). The program is now known as the Collaborative 
Trajectory Options Program (CTOP). CTOP is the natural progression of GDP and AFP under 




issues ground delay and/or reroutes to flights to balance demand with capacity. However, in 
CTOP the reroutes are done collaboratively, unlike in an AFP. The decisions made are 
collaborative in the sense that CTOP allows flight operators to submit a set of desired route 
options known as Trajectory Options Set (TOS) and indicate an associated pre-calculated cost 
for each route (RTC). It then performs the allocation of the route options and ground delays to 
the affected flights so as to satisfy the flight operators’ route preferences and FCA capacity 
constraints. The present version of CTOP performs the route and delay assignment using the 
Ration by Schedule (RBS) policy, which is based on the First Come First Served (FCFS) 
principle. We will be looking in detail about the allocation process in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
1.1. Literature review: 
Air traffic management under the CDM operating paradigm has an extensive body of 
literature. However, there is only a limited list of literature available on the allocation process 
of CTOP. There have been a few heuristics allocation algorithms proposed for CTOP. 
Pourtaklo and Ball (2009) proposed a novel approach to allocating constrained airspace 
resources. The methods proposed were designed for AFPs and SEVEN (the initial name of 
CTOP). They described a new resource rationing principle and an alternative methodology for 
use in rationing access to constrained en route airspace. The proposed allocation mechanism 
falls into a category of methods designed for fair treatment of claimants to, and allocation of, a 
constrained resource. It involved determination of the fair share of the constrained resource for 
each flight operator based on the original flight schedule as the basis of fairness. The fairness 
metric, fair share, has been used in this thesis as an equity metric to compare the proposed 
allocation mechanisms. Flights were allocated slots consistent with the fair share determined. 
The methods explicitly allowed some flights to be refused access, since the flight operators 
retain the option of rerouting around the constrained airspace. The methods required 




Vlachou and Lovell (2013) proposed a way for flight operators to express preference 
structure for their flights that are affected by CTOP and developed two resource allocation 
mechanisms build on the approaches proposed by Pourtaklo and Ball (2007) that improve the 
system efficiency and simultaneously take the flight operator preferences into account. The 
proposed preference structure was a replacement to the TOS, which strayed away from the 
framework of CTOP. They also do not solve the problem of accounting for flights that flight 
operators decide to reroute around an FCA. They also introduced a new system efficiency 
metric, preference weighted delay, which has been used in this thesis to compare the 
performance of the proposed allocation approaches.  
Kim and Hansen (2013) proposed a modeling framework through which one can 
evaluate and compare en route resource allocation schemes, and investigate the issues 
involved with incorporating user inputs in allocating constrained capacity. They have specified 
four resource assignment schemes that feature different user preference inputs and allocation 
mechanisms. These schemes are designed to offer users flexibility and ease in providing 
general preference information, or clear incentives to make the effort required to develop and 
provide timelier and richer information. 
There have been a few mixed integer linear models proposed as alternatives to the 
current CTOP resource allocation mechanism. Zhu and Wei (2018) proposed a mixed integer 
linear model to assign trajectory options and delays to the flights in a CTOP with the objective 
to minimize total system delay costs while maintaining equality across airspace. Rodionova et 
al. (2018) proposed an alternative scheduling approach based on linear optimization that 
differs from the current version of CTOP RBS allocation policy. They also developed a 





Murҫa (2018) developed a multi resource allocation model, a route and slot allocation 
model that incorporates a flight operator’s disutility cost of rerouting to avoid an impacted 
airspace to optimally schedule flights into multiple FCAs. Murҫa also evaluated the benefits of 
CTOP and assessed the impacts of accounting for airline preferences on individual and 
aggregate system delays.  
Jakobovits et al. (2007) described automated algorithms for applying restrictions to air 
traffic to prevent one or more sectors of airspace from becoming overloaded. They evaluate 
the merits of both heuristic and classical optimization approaches and identify tradeoff issues 
that affect the selection of an algorithm for the airspace problem. 
Several models have been observed in the literature review; these could be broadly 
classified into heuristics algorithms and optimization. The airlines have shown a hesitance 
towards adopting an optimization model, because of concerns with the objective function of 
the model, and equity. Traffic management actions based on optimization models are the 
biggest form of uncertainty for the flight operators after uncertainties in capacity and demand 
due to weather forecasts. Optimization models also pose another concern of computational 
speed and granularity, as optimization models rely on the discretization of time. Space-based 
allocation models featured in Zhu and Wei (2018) and Rodionova et al. (2018) are hugely 
impacted by this. Additionally, with an increase in granularity, the level of detail in 
discretization of space and time adds to the computational burden.  
The models in the literature most similar to our proposed models are models proposed 
by Pourtaklo and Ball (2009) and Vlachou and Lovell (2013). First, these models require the 
flight operator’s flight preferences. Finally, these preferences are incorporated in the allocation 
mechanisms. There are several contrasting differences in which the preferences are expressed 




models proposed by Pourtaklo and Ball (2009) and Vlachou and Lovell (2013), a slot is 
assigned to a flight operator by a random process based on the slots that are owed to the flight 
operator based on their schedule of flights at the FCA. The four allocation methods proposed 
in this thesis represent a combination of heuristics and greedy algorithms, but do not make any 
probabilistic assignments.  
1.2. Organization: 
This thesis is organized into 8 related chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the constrained airspace 
and its effects on flight, and the origin of CTOP. Chapter 2 describes CTOP in detail to 
understand its framework, and the inputs to the process. CTOP is a new TMI that is yet to be 
completely adopted by both the FAA and the flight operators; as result of this there is lack of 
an extensive list of real case studies and historical data sets available to understand the 
interactions between the flight operators and ANSP in a CTOP. In Chapter 3, we propose a 
model that could be used to represent the TOS for each flight, in the absence of real data from 
carriers. The developed cost functions were used to calculate the RTC for each trajectory 
option in a TOS. In this thesis, we propose four allocation approaches that could be used to 
perform route and delay assignment in a CTOP. The motivation behind these approaches was 
the room for improvement in the performance of the present allocation policy used in CTOP. 
We have used a simple stylized analytical model to show that there is room for improvement 
in the present form of CTOP in Chapter 4. The four proposed allocation approaches are 
explained in detail in Chapter 5. The proposed allocation approaches need an additional piece 
of information from the flight operators; this is the preference value among its own flights. 
The preference value reflects the relative priority of flights under the respective flight operator. 
We describe four strategies that could be employed by the flight operators to come up with the 
preference values in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 describes the test case scenario developed for the 




help compare the proposed allocation methods with the present CTOP allocation method and 
between the proposed allocation methods. Conclusions and future research needs are presented 









Chapter 2: Collaborative Trajectory Options Program (CTOP): 
This chapter builds on the brief introduction of CTOP provided in Section 1.1, to provide 
additional information about the CTOP TMI to understand the interactions and framework. 
CTOP is a new TMI tool developed to operate under the CDM paradigm, allowing for more 
input and flexibility from flight operators in the way that constraints are handled. CTOP 
combines the capabilities of GDPs and AFPs, and assigns delay and/or reroutes around one or 
more FCA-based airspace constraints to balance demand with available capacity (FAA, 2014). 
The decisions made are collaborative in the sense that CTOP allows flight operators to submit 
a set of desired route options known as Trajectory Options Set (TOS) and indicate an 
associated pre-calculated cost for each route (RTC). It then performs the allocation of the route 
options and ground delays to the affected flights so as to satisfy the flight operators’ route 
preferences and FCA capacity constraints.  
 
Figure 3: Flight Routes and FCAs (geometric description of the region of constrained capacity) (FAA, 2014) 
The FAA creates a CTOP to restrict aircraft demand through a Flow Constrained Area (FCA) 
during a predetermined period. CTOPs are managed by the Air Traffic Control System 
Command Center (ATCSCC). The process for defining a CTOP begins with identification of a 




(Figure 3). An FCA is a geometric description of the region of constrained capacity. Once the 
FCAs are defined by the ATCSCC, ATCSCC identifies the flights that are planned to fly 
through these FCAs as well as exempted flights. The exempted flights are usually the flights 
that are already in the air when the program is issued, international flights, and flights included 
in any higher priority TMI. The FCA’s details and corresponding capacities are shared with 
the involved NAS users (flight operators). 
 
Figure 4: TOS example of a flight from LAX (Los Angeles Airport) to ATL (Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta 
Airport) (FAA, 2014) 
 
ATCSCC receives the TOSs submitted by the flight operators for each of their affected flights 
and performs the allocation of the route options and departure delays to these flights to satisfy 
the option preferences and FCA capacity constraints following the Ration by Schedule (RBS) 
policy, the current allocation mechanism of CTOP. The current resource allocation mechanism 
of CTOP is explained in detail in Chapter 4. A TOS is a set of route options that the flight 
operators want to have considered by the CTOP allocation algorithm in assigning a route to a 
flight, either through or around an FCA. Figure 4 shows an example of a TOS for a 
hypothetical flight with Aircraft ID (ACID) ABC123, flying from Los Angeles (LAX) to 
Atlanta (ATL). The aircraft type is a Learjet 60 (LJ60). The Initial Gate Departure Time 
(IGDT) is 7:45 pm on the 5th of the month, as is the Earliest Runway Departure Time (ERDT). 





• Relative trajectory cost (RTC). This specifies the cost of this route relative to the 
planned/primary trajectory, expressed in terms of ground delay equivalent (GDE) 
minutes. 
• Required minimum notification time (RMNT). This is the minimum notification that 
must be provided to the carrier in order for it to be able to enact this route option. 
• Trajectory Valid Start Time (TVST) 
• Trajectory Valid End Time (TVET). Together, the TVST and TVET give the time 
window during which this route option is acceptable to the carrier. 
• Route. This is a sequence of NAS airspace elements, including fixes, jetways, corner-
posts, etc., that define the physical trajectory. 
• Altitude (ALT). This is expressed in units of 100s of feet. 
• Speed (SPD). This is expressed in units of nautical miles per hour. 
  
The CTOP allocation algorithm will calculate the adjusted cost for each route option in the 
TOS. The adjusted cost is the sum of the RTC and required ground delay for the candidate 
trajectory. In Chapter 3, we explain how these trajectory options in a TOS can be represented 
and how their respective RTC values can be calculated. Flight operators also have the option 
not to participate in the CTOP. Such cases arise when airlines are willing to simply accept 
whatever the ground delay is assigned on the primary/filed trajectory of the flight. In a sense, 
this is like the carrier choosing to revert to the disposition that would have been likely had a 
more traditional Ground Delay Program been applied as the TMI, instead of the more 




Chapter 3: Model for Trajectory Options Set Generation 
CTOP is a new TMI that is yet to be fully enforced by the FAA and the flight operators. As a 
result of this there is to date no extensive list of real case studies and historical data sets 
available to understand the information exchanges between the flight operators and ANSP in a 
CTOP. A new concept in CTOP allows flight operator to submit a set of desired routes, TOS, 
and indicate a pre-calculated cost for each route. In reality, these TOSs would be generated by 
the flight operators/airlines. Real data would have been preferable, but there has not been 
enough experience yet with CTOP to generate a rich set of TOSs for different situations. In 
order to be able to test different allocation methods, we needed to generate a set of synthetic 
carrier TOSs. If one were to simulate a given situation, information like ACID, departure 
airport, arrival airport, IGTD, ERTD, RMNT, Aircraft Type, TVST, and TVET, which are all 
part of a TOS, could be generated from historical data unambiguously, since they would exist 
even in the absence of a TMI. The sets of route options and the RTCs associated for these 
trajectories, however, are not self-evident, and must be synthesized using some model of air 
carrier preferences.  
To represent the TOSs, we have formulated a model to represent how these alternate 





Figure 5: Representation of trajectory/route options in a TOS 
 
The model proposes four trajectories: 
• The primary trajectory (𝑝) is the filed flight plan trajectory of the flight that is filtered 
by the FCA. 
• The avoidance trajectory (𝑒𝑡𝑖⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗ ), is the trajectory that has the least relative trajectory 
cost (RTC), out of the possible trajectories that avoid the FCA by going around it 
through way points near the extreme ends of the FCA. 
• The low Altitude trajectory (𝑙𝑜𝑤⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗ ), avoids the FCA by going below the altitude limits 
of the FCA, but otherwise following the geometry of the primary trajectory. 
• The high altitude trajectory (ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ), is similar to the low altitude trajectory, except that 





3.1. Cost functions for calculating Relative Trajectory Cost (RTC): 
Relative trajectory cost (RTC), a key part of the TOS that specifies the cost of this route 
relative to the planned/primary trajectory, is expressed in terms of ground delay equivalent 
(GDE) minutes. Flight operators assign RTCs to each trajectory option in a TOS. They are 
calculated using a cost function adopted by flight operators and are translated into equivalent 
ground delay. Each flight operator may use a different preferred cost function to calculate 
RTCs, and none would be required to reveal how they computed these internal costs. We 
propose two cost functions to calculate the RTC value. The RTC of a trajectory option is 
defined by equations (1) and (2), the units of which are (initial) Ground Delay Equivalent 
(GDE) minutes. The function 𝑓1 below gives the cost of the primary trajectory, and 𝑓2 gives 
the cost of the alternate trajectories. 
Primary trajectory cost: 𝑓1(𝑥1) =  𝑥1 + 𝑏(𝑥1 − 𝑔0)
+ (1) 
Alternative trajectory cost:  𝑓2(𝑥2,  𝑦2,  𝑧2,  ℎ2) =  𝑦2 + 𝑥2 + 𝑎𝑦2 +
𝑏(𝑥2 + 𝑎𝑦2 − 𝑔0)
+ + 𝑐𝑧2 + 𝑑ℎ2  
(2) 
Where 
• 𝑥1 = ground delay minutes assigned on the preferred/filed trajectory 
• 𝑥2 = ground delay minutes assigned on the alternate trajectory 
• 𝑦2 = additional minutes incurred by the aircraft for flying the respective trajectory 
• 𝑧2 = time of flight on the low-altitude trajectory  




• 𝑔0 = delay threshold in GDE minutes, the time after which ground cost jumps 
significantly 
• 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, and 𝑑 are cost parameters and have no units 
The variables 𝑥1, 𝑦2, 𝑧2 and ℎ2 are straightforward. From Chapter 2, we know that the CTOP 
allocation algorithm will calculate the adjusted cost for each route option in the TOS. The 
adjusted cost is the summation of the RTC and the required ground delay for the candidate 
trajectory; this required ground delay is 𝑥2 (Figure 6). The motivation behind introducing 𝑔0, 
the ground delay threshold, is that there will be some maximum amount of ground delay that 
the flight operators/airlines would be willing to accept for a flight, such that the ground delay 
assigned will not have an impact on the individual flight’s schedule or its fleet schedule. This 
could be based on numerous factors like connecting flights, crew operations, gate assignment, 
etc. The cost/impact of ground delay might significantly increase once the assigned ground 
delay exceeds this value due to the characteristics of an individual flight; that additional cost 
per-GDE minute is given by 𝑏. The amount of increase in cost could vary a lot, depending on 
the flight and flight operator in question. The parameter 𝑎 is the excess cost per minute of air 
delay versus ground delay. The parameter 𝑐 converts the excess cost of a low-altitude flight 
minute into equivalent ground delay minutes. The parameter 𝑑 converts the excess cost of a 
high-altitude flight minute into equivalent ground delay minutes, if any. The notation 






Figure 6: Calculation of adjusted cost for route options in a TOS (FAA, 2014) 
 
For the purpose of simulation, certain assumptions have been made about the values of these 
parameter values and how could they be expressed. For example, one might expect the cost of 
delay to jump around 30 GDE minutes. Flights that experience delay less than 15 minutes are 
still considered to be on time, so perhaps a good threshold limit for flight operators would be 
twice this value, but it could be less or more depending on the flight operator. Thus, in a 
simulation we might make 𝑔0 uniformly distributed between 20 and 40 GDE minutes. The 
marginal cost of delays above this threshold, 𝑏, could vary among the flight operators, and it 
could even vary among the flights of an individual flight operator. For simulation purposes, 
we have represented it using a uniform distribution between 2 and 10. Among the aviation 
field 𝑎 is generally considered to be 2, as it is a common rule of thumb to consider one unit of 
air delay equivalent to two minute of ground delay (see for example Ball et al., 2003; Liu and 
Hansen, 2014; and Bertsimas and Patterson, 2000). For simulation purposes, to allow some 
variance, we model 𝑎 as uniformly distributed between 1.8 and 2.2. Currently, 𝑐 is modeled as 
a constant 0.1, although with more information one could also apply a probability distribution. 
It relates to excess fuel burn due to flying at low altitude as the higher air density at low 




interaction of air molecules with the surface of the aircraft. The actual value would depend on 
a combination of various factors: the fuel market price, type of aircraft, payload, and the flying 
altitude. The intuition behind 𝑑 is that for an aircraft to fly at high altitudes, although the 
flying is more efficient once the aircraft gets there, the aircraft must first climb to that altitude, 
which requires additional lift and increased speed. As a result, the aircraft engines rotate at 
high rpms during the climb, thus leading to a higher fuel flow into the engines. However, the 
low fuel burn when flying at high altitudes may remediate this, if this segment of the flight is 
long enough. Of course, this is the reason that aircraft fly at relatively high altitudes to begin 
with. It is also important to understand that different aircraft have different operating 
envelopes, leading to different restrictions on how high they can fly. 
To calculate 𝑦2, we need to find the additional flight time on an alternate trajectory in 
comparison to the primary/pre-filed trajectory. This is done by finding the difference in 
distance between the primary trajectory and alternate trajectories and dividing it by the 
average speed of the aircraft. To find the difference in distance we need to find the distances 
shown in Figure 8 (𝑂𝑃, 𝑃𝐷, 𝑂𝐸1, 𝑂𝐸2, 𝐸1𝐷, 𝐸2𝐷). To compute the distance between two 
coordinates we use the Haversine formula (Equation 3 and Figure 7), which calculates the 














Figure 7: Haversine formula 
 
Figure 8: 2D representation of TOS 
 
Figure 9: Calculating flight distance 
 
The distance 𝐷𝑖 for trajectory 𝑖 (primary: 0, alternate: 𝑖) is the flight’s distance from its origin 




flight will pass through the FCA; this is assumed to be the flight’s cruising altitude for 
simplicity), 𝑙𝑑𝑖 = haversine (coordinate_1, coordinate_2) in nautical miles. 
𝑙𝑑0 = |𝑂𝑃⃗⃗⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ | + |𝑃𝐷⃗⃗⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ | (4) 







2 , 𝑖 = 1, 2 
 
𝑦2  =  (𝐷𝑖 – 𝐷0)/𝑎𝑣𝑔. 𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑛𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒 (6) 
 
 
3.1.1. Calculating Relative Trajectory Cost for trajectories: 
The Relative Trajectory Cost (RTC) for each trajectory option in the TOS specifies the cost of 
the route relative to the planned/primary trajectory. To find the RTC, we set RTC to the 
minimum value of 𝑥1 such that, 
𝑓1() ≥  𝑓2()  (7) 
When we set 𝑥2 = 0, the ground delay assigned to the candidate alternate trajectory is zero. 
The minimum value of 𝑥1, is the value of 𝑥1 such that the two functions are equal. Thus, the 




𝑓1(𝑥1) =  𝑓2(0,  𝑦2,  𝑧2,  ℎ2) (8) 
If we set 𝑘 =  𝑓2(0,  𝑦2,  𝑧2,  ℎ2), then we have 
𝑅𝑇𝐶 =  {
𝑘                                                  𝑖𝑓 𝑘 <=  𝑔0
  𝑔0 +  
𝑘–  𝑔0
𝑏 + 1
                  𝑖𝑓 𝑘 >  𝑔0







Chapter 4: CTOP resource allocation policy 
The present version of CTOP performs route and delay assignment using a Ration by Schedule 
(RBS) policy, which is based on the First Come First Served (FCFS) principle. In this thesis, 
we propose four alternate allocation approaches that could be used to perform route and slot 
assignment in a CTOP. The motivation behind these approaches was the room for 
improvement in the performance of the present allocation policy used in CTOP. We have used 
a simple stylized analytical model to show that there is room for improvement in the present 
form of CTOP. Resource allocation strategies in general are influenced by three factors: what 
resources are to be allocated, what allocation standards and principles are to be used, and 
which algorithm is to be adopted. In CTOP, the resources that the flights and the airlines/flight 
operators compete for are the FCA capacities (FAA, 2014). Slot-based allocation is the 
approach used in GDPs and AFPs by the FAA; CTOP is no different in that respect. The FAA 
uses a slot-based RBS allocation, based on the FCFS principle with respect to initial scheduled 
arrival times for CTOP. The flights affected by the CTOP are sorted by their earliest Estimated 
Time of Arrival at the FCA (ETA), creating the Initial Arrival Time (IAT) order. The FAA 
allocates the slots to flights and makes rerouting decisions based on the adjusted cost; the 
CTOP allocation algorithm will calculate the adjusted cost for each route option in the TOS. If 
the ground delay assigned on the primary trajectory exceeds the adjusted cost of a route option 
in the TOS, the flight is rerouted.  
In slot-based allocation, each time interval at the FCA is subdivided into equal time 
slots, with each slot assigned to no more than one flight. The number of slots within the time 
interval and the slot duration depends on the FCA capacity, this is known as the rate of the 
FCA for a given time. It is usually expressed as the number of flights that can be processed at 




FCA per hour during the respective time interval, so there are 60 available slots during an hour 
period and each slot is a minute long. To understand the need for better allocation algorithms 
than the present RBS policy, we shall investigate the delay savings from implementing a 
CTOP, and how a CTOP impacts delay cost and trajectory choice as a function of various 
CTOP parameters. We describe models for determining the delay savings by CTOP.  
The RBS policy is the most widely accepted notion of fairness in ATM, and hence it 
serves as a key underlying principle in the allocation processes used in TMIs like GDPs and 
AFPs. It has also been shown that RBS is the optimal allocation for a single resource problem 
(Vossen and Ball, 2006). From this point onwards, we will be addressing the current RBS 
allocation process used in a CTOP as CTOP_RBS.  The algorithm of CTOP_RBS is as 
follows: 
1. Consider a slot (in chronological order) 
2. Find the list of flights that can be assigned to that slot 
3. Sort the flights by their arrival time at the FCA 
4. Calculate the delay for the earliest flight that can be assigned to the slot 
5. If the delay (GDE minutes) for the flight is less than or equal to the adjusted cost of 
the nominal trajectory in the TOS 
a. Assign the slot to the flight, and the flight takes the ground delay assigned, if 
any 
6. If the delay (GDE minutes) is greater than the adjusted cost of the nominal trajectory 
a. Reroute the flight to one of the trajectories from the TOS. 
i. When rerouting flights, assign the trajectory that has the least adjusted 
cost (summation of RTC and required ground delay for the candidate 
trajectory) from the TOS. The choice of trajectory impacts the 





This process (steps 1 through 6) is repeated until all possible slots within the CTOP period 
have been allocated. 
 
 





We can apply a continuous approximation to study a CTOP under a single FCA. This will 
serve to illustrate some basic ideas and to give strategic insight for further analysis and CTOP 
planning. Assume that the capacity for the single FCA is given by 𝑅 (flights per minute). For 
this exercise, also assume this is the rate at which flights are scheduled to approach the FCA. 
Let 𝑁𝐹(𝑡) represent the cumulative number of flights that have passed the FCA boundary by 
time 𝑡. Also let 𝑇(𝑘) represent the time at which flight 𝑘 reaches the FCA boundary. Then the 
following two equations hold: 
𝑁𝐹(𝑡) =  𝑅𝑡  (10) 





For example, with 𝑅 = 0.5 flights per minute (30 flights per hour, 1 flight per 2 min, 30 equal 
slots of 2 min each): 𝑁𝐹(60) = 0.5 ∗  60 =  30 , 30 flights reach the FCA in the 1st hour and 
with 𝑅 = 0.5 and 𝑘 = 60; 𝑇(60) =  60 / 0.5 =  120 minutes, the time when the 60th flight 
reaches the FCA. 
To investigate the delay savings by CTOP and the CTOP’s impact on flight delays, we 
now consider that there is a reduction in FCA capacity, which leads to a reduction in the rate at 
which the FCA can process flights. As demand exceeds capacity, the FAA implements a TMI, 
which will lead to the initiation of a CTOP. We consider two cases to show the delay savings 
by CTOP. In the first scenario, a Ground Delay Program (GDP) is the TMI implemented by 
the FAA (assuming CTOP is not implemented). If we represent the capacity reduction by way 
of a rate reduction factor 𝑤, where 0 ≤ 𝑤 ≤ 1, then the new (reduced) rate will be 𝑤𝑅. Let 
𝐷(𝑘, 𝑤) represent the delay cost in Ground Delay Equivalent (GDE) minutes for the 𝑘𝑡ℎ flight 




to include 𝑤 as a parameter, i.e., 𝑇’(𝑘, 𝑤) = the time the 𝑘𝑡ℎ flight reaches the FCA boundary 
under the reduced rate, then 
𝑇’(𝑘, 𝑤) =  𝑘/(𝑤𝑅)  (12) 





















) =  40 GDE minutes 
Assuming a continuous linear approximation, the total delay in units of flights-GDE minutes 













Figure 11: Delay cost per flight without CTOP vs flight index based on the Initial Arrival Time (IAT) order 
at the FCA 
 
In the second scenario, instead of a GDP, the FAA implements a CTOP. Under CTOP, when a 




rerouted to the respective route option; adjusted cost is the summation of RTC and required 
ground delay for the candidate trajectory. It is important to note that in our analysis the 
required ground delay for the candidate trajectory is assumed to be zero, thus when a flight’s 
delay gets large enough it will opt to one of the trajectories from its TOS completely based on 
its RTC. 
 For illustrative purposes, suppose that all flights have the same RTC, and that that 
value is 𝑝. Our goal is to show the delay savings by CTOP as well as to provide the basic ideas 
and strategic insight for further analysis and CTOP planning. If we let 𝐷’(𝑘, 𝑤, 𝑝) = the delay 
cost in Ground Delay Equivalent (GDE) minutes for the kth flight under a CTOP with common 
RTC 𝑝, then 






) ,  𝑝}  
(15) 
If we denote by 𝑘∗ the flight index at which a flight first switches to it alternate route, and 






) = 𝑝 ⟹  𝑘∗ =
𝑝 𝑅 𝑤
1 − 𝑤
   
(16) 
The total delay cost with CTOP can then be given (Figures 12 and 13) as: 
𝑇𝐷′(𝑘, 𝑤, 𝑝) = {
𝑇𝐷(𝑘, 𝑤),   𝑘 ≤ 𝑘∗








Figure 12: Plot of delay cost per flight with and without CTOP 
 
Figure 13: Delay savings by CTOP 
 
The delay savings from CTOP can be computed as follows: 
𝐷𝑆(𝑘, 𝑤, 𝑝) = {
0,   𝑘 ≤ 𝑘∗







Figure 14: Delay cost per flight with CTOP vs flight index based on the Initial Arrival Time (IAT) order at 
the FCA 
This analysis assumed a single FCA, a continuous buildup of flights, and an elevated level of 
certainty regarding delays/reduced capacity. We understand that in more dynamic/uncertain 
settings, things may be different. If there are multiple FCAs, things will become more 
complex. However, our goal was to show the delay savings by CTOP, provide basic ideas, and 
to give strategic insight to show the need for a better allocation policy. We will demonstrate 
that the proposed allocation mechanisms perform significantly better than CTOP_RBS by 
developing a more realistic test case in Chapter 7. From the analytical model we can see that 
incorporating rerouting as a control mechanism besides ground delay reduces total flight 
delays significantly, emphasizing the benefits of a CTOP program over the traditional TMIs 
like GDPs. It is also intuitively clear that it should not be necessary for all flights after the 
𝑘∗threshold (Figure 14) to suffer a delay cost of 𝑝. This problem within the current allocation 
principle of CTOP (CTOP_RBS) brings up the space and need for a better allocation 




Chapter 5:  Short queue allocation algorithm for CTOP 
As discussed in Chapter 4, there is an improvement that can be made to the CTOP RBS, which 
brings up the need for a better alternative resource allocation method. This chapter describes 
the approaches developed and prerequisites for the same. We propose four approaches based 
on the principle that by building a queue of assignable flights at the slot and rerouting a 
percentage of flights so that the queue does not increase in size (maintaining the queue size at 
or below a fixed value), we can reduce the total delay and as a result increase the delay savings 
by CTOP. The approaches have a common parameter called 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥, the maximum queue 
size. We will impose a (virtual) queue at the FCA, to ensure that it is saturated to the extent 
possible. 
 
The four variations of short queue allocation algorithms are BPRA, RIBPRA, 
RIBPRA_E, and RIBPRA_RBS. Each is a form of priority resource allocation (PRA), and the 
details surrounding the naming of each are given in the sections below. The prerequisite for 
these algorithms is that in addition to the TOS submitted by flight operators for a flight they 
must specify a preference value for their flights. Flight operators (airline carriers) assign a 
preference value to each flight involved in CTOP, which is a way of indicating their own 
priority among their flights: 
1. Preference value is an integer between 1 (lowest priority) and 5 (highest priority) 
(Vlachou and Lovell, 2013). 
2. The average over all assigned preference values for a given carrier must be 3. 
This provides flight operators the ability to express priorities over their flights. The current 
CTOP has the ability only for the flight operators to express their preferences for the alternate 
trajectories for a flight (by expressing RTC for the trajectories in a TOS), but does not allow 




a platform for better knowledge sharing and thereby enabling the flight operators/airlines and 
the FAA to decide on which flights must be allocated a slot or given access to constrained air 
space (FCA) and flights to be rerouted. The secondary motivation for introducing a preference 
value that indicates a priority order of flights is that flight operators do not have a say in which 
flights get allocated a slot at the FCA and which flights get rerouted within the current 
framework of CTOP. In Chapter 6, we explain how the flight operators/airlines can assign the 
preference values to their flights. 
To increase the delay savings by a CTOP and decrease the total delay, it is imperative 
to choose judiciously which flights are going to be allocated slots at the FCA and which are 
going to be rerouted. The rerouting control mechanism present in the current form of CTOP is 
very vulnerable. Flight operators could easily game the system by filing artificial RTC values 
for the route options in the TOS for a flight. It can be shown that RTC plays a key role in the 
decision of whether or not to reroute a flight.  Under CTOP, when a flight’s delay gets large 
enough, it will opt to one of the alternate trajectories. If the RTC is set to an exceptionally 
large value, the flight in question will fly its primary (filed) trajectory. Under the CDM 
environment it would not be hard for flight operators to figure out the flights competing for the 
same slot and try to game the system. This would not only impact the total delay assigned to 
its competitor’s flights, but would also degrade the system efficiency. If all the flight operators 
employ this strategy of filing artificial RTC values for their flight’s rerouting options, this 
would produce the same effect as if a traditional Ground Delay Program had been applied as 
the TMI, instead of the more contemporary CTOP. 
Airlines are aware of CTOP’s benefits and its vulnerabilities, which leads to their 
concerns about the amount of information that might be required to share while participating 
in CTOP (Vlachou and Lovell, 2013). To encourage the airlines/flight operators to submit this 
information about the relative priority of their flights and ensure the system is less prone to 




airline must be 3. This is to prevent the airlines from simply assigning all their flights a 
preference value of 5.  
It is important to note that with the resource allocation process under the CDM 
paradigm using RBS (Figure 15), the RBS process is followed by a cancellations and 
substitution process, where airlines may cancel flights and modify slot-to-flights assignments 
for its own flights (intra-airline exchange) by exchanging the slots within its flights. Finally, 
“compression” is carried out by the FAA, which maximizes slot utilization by performing an 
inter-airline slot exchange to ensure that no slot goes unused. After the round of cancellations 
and substitution, the utilization of slots can usually be improved. The reason for this that an 
airline’s flight cancellations and delays may create “holes” (slots without a flight) in the 
current schedule (Ball et al., 2007). For a detailed explanation of the cancellation, substitution, 
and compression processes, and how these “holes” might occur, the reader is referred to Ball 
et al., 2007. One of the reasons to have the airlines express their priority of flights involved in 
our proposed approach is to try to subsume the cancellation, substitution, and compression 
steps within our allocation algorithm. To be clear, however, the algorithm does not cancel any 
flights – this is a decision that is ultimately made only by the carrier. The goal is to allow 
carriers’ most valued flights to receive the most favorable treatment, within that carrier’s fair 
allotment of resources, to mitigate what would have been the need for most cancellations 
under earlier generations of TMIs. Of course, some cancellations are still likely to occur. 
 
 




5.1. Balanced Priority Resource Allocation (BPRA) (Ball, 2018): 
The first allocation method presented here is the Balanced Priority Resource Allocation 
(BPRA) algorithm. The BPRA algorithm allocates slots to flights based on the order that is 
derived from the IAT of flights at the FCA, in the same way as the RBS policy, which is based 
on the FCFS principle. The difference between BPRA and CTOP_RBS is how the rerouting 
decision is made and which flight is rerouted. In BPRA, the rerouting decision is based on the 
parameter 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥, the maximum queue size, unlike in CTOP_RBS, where the decision to 
reroute is not made until the delay experienced by a flight exceeds the adjusted cost of the 
nominal trajectory. Once the size of the queue of assignable flights at the slot exceeds 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥 
by one, the flight with the lowest preference value is rerouted and removed from the queue. As 
a part of this allocation, we introduce a metric that will be dynamically computed for each 
airline based on the number of flights rerouted and the flights processed; see equation (19). 
This is to ensure that an airline that has more flights arriving late into the queue does not get 
penalized, and attempts to address any equity concerns. The number of flights processed is the 
summation of the number of flights that have been assigned a slot at the FCA and the number 
of rerouted flights for each airline. We make the following assumption: the prerequisite for the 
algorithm is that in addition to the TOS submitted by flight operators for a flight they must 
specify the preferences for their flights as described above and adhere to the rules developed in 
assigning these preference values.  
Reroute rate (𝑹 − 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆):  
𝑅 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑








The algorithm of the allocation is as follows (Figure 16): 
1. Consider a slot (in chronological order) 
2. Find the list of flights that can be assigned to the slot 
3. Sort the flights by their arrival time at the FCA 
4. If the queue size is greater than or equal to 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 1 
a. Consider only flights within 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 1 from the formed queue  
b. Reroute and remove the flight with the lowest preference value from the 
queue 
i. In the case of a tie, choose the airline with the lowest 𝑅 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 value 
ii. When rerouting flights, assign the trajectory that has the least adjusted 
cost (summation of RTC and required ground delay for the candidate 
trajectory) from the TOS. The choice of trajectory does not factor into 
the decision of whether or not to reroute, since it is based on the 
preference value. 
c. Repeat step 4 until the queue length is equal to 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥 
5. If the queue size is less than or equal to 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥 













5.2. Reroute Incentive Balanced Priority Resource Allocation (RIBPRA): 
We understand that it is imperative to identify the flights that need to be rerouted and the 
flights that must be allocated slots. This could be done only if the preference values presented 
are truthful. To further encourage the flight operators to provide the preference value for their 
lights, we introduce a dynamically maintained incentive metric called  𝑅𝑖 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 (Equation 
20). 
𝑅𝑖 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 =  𝞢 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠   (20) 
We make changes to the decision principles that dictate the allocation of slots and reroutes. It 
can also be seen that we have shifted from a slot-to-flight allocation to a pseudo flight-to-slot 
allocation scheme. The RIBPRA algorithm is as follows (Figure 17): 
1. Consider a slot 
2. Find the list of flights that can be assigned to the slot 
3. Sort the flights by their arrival time at the FCA 
4. If the queue size is greater than or equal to 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 1 
a. Consider only flights within 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 1 from the formed queue  
b. Reroute and remove the flight with lowest sum of preference value and 𝑅𝑖 −
𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 from the queue 
i. In the case of a tie, choose the flight from the airline with the lowest 
𝑅 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 value 
ii. When rerouting flights, assign the trajectory that has the least adjusted 
cost (summation of RTC and required ground delay for the candidate 




the decision of whether to reroute the flight or not, as it is based on 
the priority rather than the adjusted cost of a trajectory. 
c. Repeat step 4 until the queue length is equal to 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥 
5. If the queue size is less than or equal to 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥 
a. Assign the slot to the flight that has the largest sum of preference value and 
𝑅𝑖 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 in the queue 










5.3. Modified Reroute Incentive Balanced Priority Resource Allocation 
(RIBPRA_E): 
 
Equity concern is of prime importance when choosing an algorithm. One of the ways to ensure 
equity in an algorithm is by making sure that the algorithm avoids disparity and efficiency is 
transferred across the participants. In the analysis that will be shown later, Figures 33, 41 and 
43 demonstrate that the RIBPRA allocation algorithm provides an advantage to big carriers or 
flight operators who have a high percentage of flights under a CTOP. To get rid of this 
undesired property in RIBPRA, we change the incentive metric to represent the average value 
of 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟. The new incentive metric is called 𝐴𝑅𝑖 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 (Equation 21). 
 
Average reroute metric (𝐴𝑅𝑖 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟):  
𝐴𝑅𝑖 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 =  
𝞢𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠




The RIBPRA algorithm is as follows (Figure 18): 
1. Consider a slot 
2. Find the list of flights that can be assigned to the slot 
3. Sort the flights by their arrival time at the FCA 
4. If the queue size is greater than or equal to 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥  + 1 
a. Consider only flights within 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 1 from the formed queue  
b. Reroute and remove the flight with the lowest sum of preference value and 
𝐴𝑅𝑖 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 from the queue 
i. In the case of a tie, choose the flight from the airline with the lowest 




ii. When rerouting flights, assign the trajectory that has the least adjusted 
cost (summation of RTC and required ground delay for the candidate 
trajectory) from the TOS. The choice of trajectory does not factor into 
the decision of whether to reroute the flight or not, as it is based on 
the priority rather than the adjusted cost of a trajectory. 
c. Repeat step 4 until the queue length is equal to 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥. 
5. If the queue size is less than or equal to 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥 
a. Assign the slot to the flight that has the largest sum of preference value and 
𝐴𝑅𝑖 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 in the queue. 











5.4. Reroute Incentive Balanced Priority Resource Allocation based on RBS 
(RIBPRA_RBS): 
 
The final allocation method is a variation of the RIBPRA_E algorithm, which is also modified 
to reflect the importance of equity in the allocation process. It is like the BPRA algorithm in 
how it allocates slots to flights. It must be noted that both of these algorithms, BPRA and 
RIBPRA_RBS, also address the equity issue by adopting a First Come (scheduled) First 
Served (FCFS) principle (RBS policy) to allocate slots to flights. There are several equity 
criteria (Wanke et al., 2006) that can be considered, but no one of them is universally 
accepted. On the other hand, there have been several studies that address equity by defining 
the flight priority order and scheduling flights in the order using FCFS, which is considered to 
be equitable by the FAA and flight operators (Ball et al., 2005; Hoffman et al., 2005; Ball et 
al., 2010; Jakobovits et al., 2005; and Burke, 2002). The reasoning behind this is the fact that 
the flights are scheduled by the respective carriers/flight operators; the carriers would have 
made changes to this order if they would have wanted to implement a change.  
The RIBPRA_RBS algorithm is as follows (Figure 19), 
1. Consider a slot 
2. Find the list of flights that can be assigned to the slot 
3. Sort the flights by their arrival time at the FCA 
4. If the queue size is more than or equal to 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 1 
a. Consider only 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥 + 1  flights from the formed queue  
b. Reroute and remove the flight with the lowest sum of preference value and 
𝐴𝑅𝑖 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 from the queue 
i. In the case of a tie, choose the flight from the airline with the lowest 




ii. When rerouting flights, assign the trajectory that has the least adjusted 
cost (summation of RTC and required ground delay for the candidate 
trajectory) from the TOS. The choice of trajectory does not factor into 
the decision of whether to reroute the flight or not, as it is based on 
the priority rather than the adjusted cost of a trajectory. 
c. Repeat step 4 until the queue length is equal to 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥 
5. If the queue size is less than or equal to 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥 








Chapter 6: Model for assigning preference values for flights 
The proposed allocation approaches require that each airline assign a preference value ranging 
from 1 to 5 to each of their flights in a CTOP. The preference value reflects the relative 
priority of flights under the respective airline, from flights that the airline would not mind if 
they get rerouted (preference value 1), to flights that they do not want to get rerouted and 
suffer huge delays (preference value 5), and other dispositions in between. We describe four 
different strategies that could be employed by the airlines to assign preference values based on 
a simple linear weighted score function. Let 𝐹𝑎 be the set of flights in a CTOP that belongs to 
airline 𝑎 from the set of airlines 𝐴. For every flight 𝑓 from 𝐹𝑎, 𝑉𝑓 (Equation 22) is the measure 
of relative flight value, where 𝑢𝑖 is assigned a value based on the aircraft size, duration of 
flight, number of passengers and number of passengers with connecting flights, etc. 𝑃𝑓, the 
preference value, is based on the weighted score 𝑇𝑆𝑓 for each flight 𝑓. 𝑆𝑅𝑇𝐶𝑓 is the measure 
of relative flight value based on the RTC, where 𝑅𝑇𝐶𝑖 is the nominal RTC value for flight 𝑖 
from its respective TOS. The weight factor 𝑡 is specific to each airline but for the purpose of 
simulation, these are equally weighed. i.e. 𝑡 = 0.5 






𝑇𝑆𝑓 = 𝑡𝑉𝑓 + (1 − 𝑡)𝑆𝑅𝑇𝐶𝑓, for ∀ 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹𝑎  & 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 (24) 
𝑃𝑓 = 𝑄(𝑇𝑆𝑓) (25) 
We have identified three strategies that an airline could use to assign the preference value 




6.1. Strategy I: 
Strategy I could be the strategy of no participation; i.e., the strategy could be employed to 
assign preference values for an airline that has decided not to participate in a CTOP or flight 
operators who have only one flight in a CTOP. It is as follows, 
▪ Assign all flights Preference value 3 
▪ Pf
 = 𝑄(𝑇𝑆𝑓) = 3 ∀ 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹𝑎 
6.2. Strategy II: 
 
Strategy II is the method we anticipate that a large section of the flight operators/airlines 
would be likely to employ. It is as follows, 
▪ Equally assign Preference value 1-5, 
• 20% Preference value 1  
• 20% Preference value 2 
• ... 
• 20% Preference value 5  
 
This could be achieved by the airlines by sorting their flights in a CTOP based on the weighted 
score 𝑇𝑆𝑓, and then assigning preference value 1 to the first 20% of the flights in the order, 
preference value 2 to the next 20%, and so on. This could be employed by an airline only 
when the number of flights in a CTOP is divisible by 5. If the total number of flights is not 
divisible by 5, then let n be the remainder when the number of flights is divided by 5. For the 
final set of flights, assign priorities as follows:  
▪ If 𝑛 = 1, assign {3} 
▪ If 𝑛 = 2, assign {2, 4} or {1, 5} 




▪ If 𝑛 = 4, assign {1, 2, 4, 5}  
6.3. Strategy III: 
Strategy III is very straightforward and simple: assign the preference value 2 or 1 to half of the 
flights in the CTOP, namely the flights with lower 𝑇𝑆𝑓 scores; assign the other half the 
preference value 4 or 5, respectively. For instances with an odd number of flights, assign the 
preference value 3 to the remainder.  
6.4. Strategy IV: 
Strategy IV is the only asymmetric strategy; meaning that it does not aim to assign equal 
numbers of 2’s and 4’s, or equal numbers of 1’s and 5’s, but nevertheless strives for the 
average priority across all flights to be 3. This strategy could be employed by an airline when 
it has, for example, more low priority flights and very few high priority flights. The 
assignment of preference value is solely based on an individual airline’s operational 
requirement and flight priority. Figure 20 illustrates the possible number of combinations that 
can be achieved for the corresponding number of flights.  The number of possible 






Figure 20: Possible asymmetric combinations for n flights 
It might appear that such a preference value list is long and would be cumbersome for 
airlines/flight operators to produce. However, the airlines/flight operators would have all the 
information needed to produce the priority list, and this preference value is used only to 
represent the relative value of flights operated by the respective airlines/flight operator. 
Nevertheless, in the past when TMIs like GDPs and AFPs have been deployed, and 
cancellations and substitutions have been generated by carriers, there must have been some 
reasoning, coupled with numerical data, to support these choices. It is reasonable to assume 
that the generation of a list of preferences is no more onerous than what would have gone into 
this process. Furthermore, if a carrier does not want to bother, then a default assignment of 





Chapter 7:  Experimental Results and Discussions 
To demonstrate the performance of our proposed allocation models, we describe a test case 
scenario where a CTOP is implemented by the FAA. The data used for the test case are the 
traffic demand data for the date 6 September 2016. These data contain the following fields: 
flight reference number, scheduled (planned) departure time, scheduled (planned) arrival time, 
planned cruise altitude level, aircraft type, waypoints of the planned route in LAT/LON 
LAT/LON format, aircraft tail number, origin airport, and destination airport. The data for our 
experiment were provided by Tim Myers and Dr. Robert Hoffman from Metron Aviation.  
7.1. Boundaries of the experiment:  
For our experiment, the test case scenario is based on a single FCA CTOP program. The FCA 
used is one from the list of canned FCAs (FCAA05) by the FAA. The FCA is used by the 
FAA to capture flights through Indianapolis Center (ZID) and Cleveland Center (ZOB) from 
the west, destined to airports in Northern Washington Center (ZDC), New York Center (ZNY) 
and Boston Center (ZBW). The FCA is located over the western boundary of ZOB and eastern 





Figure 21: FCA, Geographical representation of the constrained airspace FCAA05 
 
We developed a computer program using JAVA to obtain the list of flights captured by the 
FCA. The inputs are simply the flight traffic demand data for the specific date and the end 
coordinates of the FCA expressed in LAT/LON format. Only flights that had destination 
airports in the regions ZNY, ZBW and ZDC, and that had cruising altitude between 12000 ft. 
to 45000 ft. were considered. These filtering parameters are part of the dynamic nature of a 
regular FCA in a CTOP (Gaertner et al., 2007). The FCA was assumed to be active for a 4-
hour period, starting at 1600 Zulu and ending at 2000 Zulu. A total of 313 flights were 
captured by the proposed CTOP test case scenario. The nominal capacity of the FCA was 
assumed to be 120 flights per hour, and the reduced capacity 60 flights per hr. The demand at 





Figure 22: Demand at the FCAA05 on 9/6/2016 
 
The initial arrival times of flights at the FCA were calculated based on their primary (filed) 
trajectories. For each flight, a TOS was modeled based on the model proposed under Chapter 
3, and RTCs were calculated for the respective route options using the model proposed in 
Section 3.1. Flights were always rerouted to the trajectory with the least RTC, as it was 
assumed that the required ground delay for the trajectories in the TOS is zero. For the purpose 
of analysis the airlines/flight operators were assumed to employ Strategy II (Chapter 6.2) to 
assign preference values to their flights. The Required Minimum Notification Time (RMNT) 
for all flights in the test case CTOP was assumed to be 45 min, and the CTOP advisory notice 
was sent out at least 45 min earlier than the first scheduled flight captured by CTOP. The file 
time of a CTOP is important, as airborne flights cause huge delays to the system and they also 
lose the rerouting option if a CTOP was filed too late. The analysis of file time of a CTOP has 
its own research domain and will be not be considered here. Thus, it is assumed that the CTOP 
advisory notice is issued well in advance by the FAA to the airlines/flight operators and there 





7.2. Comparison of the allocation schemes: 
We compare the results of the four proposed allocation methods against one another and with 
the existing CTOP allocation policy (CTOP_RBS). For the following set of results, we restrict 
the max queue in the BPRA, RIBPRA, RIBPRA_E, and RIBPRA_RBS algorithms to 6. 
The key metric that exhibits the system efficiency performance measure of an 
allocation scheme is the total delay of the participating flights. From Figure 23, it is can be 
clearly seen that the proposed allocation methods’ performance is significantly better than the 
existing allocation policy of CTOP (CTOP_RBS). RIBPRA and RIBPRA_E achieved a 
reduction of more than 50% in total delays when compared to CTOP_RBS while BPRA and 
RIBPRA_RBS achieved a reduction of slightly less than 50% in total delays. The performance 
superiority of the proposed algorithms over CTOP_RBS is clear. 
 
 































The total delay of flights has two hidden metrics within, the cumulative delay of flights that 
were assigned a slot and the cumulative delay of flights that were rerouted. Figure 25 shows 
how these metrics vary for the different allocation policies. As we predicted in Chapter 5 
based on the analytical model, by rerouting a percentage of flights and thereby maintaining a 
small queue size, the delay savings from CTOP can be maximized; this is displayed in Figures 
23 and 25. The delay accumulated on the flights assigned a slot is reduced considerably and 
because of rerouting a higher percentage of flights (Figure 24 and 25) there is an increase in 
the cumulative delay of rerouted flights. However, we can see that there is not a prominent 
difference in the average delay of rerouted flights from Figure 26. 
 
Figure 24: Number of flights assigned a slot and rerouted 
239 239 239 239 258


















Number of flights assigned a slot and rerouted | Max queue = 6





Figure 25: Total delay split over flights assigned a slot and rerouted 
 
 
Figure 26: Average delay per flight 
In the results displayed so far, all flights are considered “equal” in the sense that a unit of 
delay to any of the flights is counted equally. However, it was clear from earlier sections that 
there was some motivation to distinguish flights by the priorities assigned to them by their 
carriers. As a result, it makes sense to investigate a metric that allows delays to higher priority 
flights to play a more important role than delays of the same magnitude to lower priority 
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Average delay per flight (GDE min) | Max queue = 6




flights. To this end, we introduce a metric called preference weighted delay; it is computed by 
multiplying the delay for each flight by its preference value. This gives us a measure of how 
well the allocation schemes allocates delay to the high priority flights and how effectively it 
ensures that the low priority flights are rerouted/assigned a route option from its TOS. One of 
the goals with the proposed approaches was to try to subsume the cancellation, substitution, 
and compression processes that follow RBS in a CDM paradigm. Since BPRA, RIBPRA, 
RIBPRA_E and RIBPRA_RBS rerouted the same number of flights (Figure 24), the 
preference weighted delay metric can give us insight into what are the flights that are assigned 
a slot at the FCA or rerouted.  
 
Figure 27: Total preference weighted delay 
It is clear from Figure 27 that RIBPRA_E performs better than the other proposed approaches. 
Figure 28 gives us an insight into how the preference weighted delay is split among the flights 
assigned a slot and rerouted. Figure 28 also reinforces the result that RIBPRA_E outperforms 
the other proposed approaches, as it produces the least amount of preference weighted delay to 
the 239 flights that were assigned a slot and the least amount of cumulative delay on flights 
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least amount of preference weighted delay of rerouted flights. It should also be noted that 
though BPRA produces the least amount of cumulative delay of rerouted flights (Figure 25), 
RIBPRA performs better than BPRA by ensuring that rerouted flights are of low priority, 
which can be seen from Figure 28.  
 
Figure 28: Total preference weighted delay split by flights assigned a slot and rerouted 
Another way to study the impact of the stated flight preferences is to measure the average 
preference of the flights assigned a slot and rerouted. If the preference structure works as 
intended, then arguably the average preference of flights assigned a slot should be high, as 
high priority flights should have precedence for slot assignments. Conversely, the average 
preference of rerouted flights should be (relatively) low. Figure 29 restates the information that 
RIBPRA_E overshadows the other approaches in overall system efficiency; it has the highest 
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Figure 29: Average preference value of flights assigned a slot and rerouted 
 
Figure 30: Preference distribution among the flights assigned a slot 
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Preference distribution among flights assigned a slot
Max queue = 6





Figure 31: Preference distribution among rerouted flights 
Figure 30 and Figure 31 tell us about the preference value distribution among the flights 
assigned a slot and flights rerouted. It gives the number of flights that were assigned a slot and 
rerouted, by each of the respective preference values. From Figure 30, we can see that not all 
flights that were assigned preference value 1 by the corresponding airlines were rerouted; 
some were assigned a slot. Additionally, the flights that were assigned a preference value 4 or 
5 were almost never rerouted. This shows that it is not the case that the allocation method 
simply reroutes all the flights with the low preference numbers and gives slots to the high 
priority flights; the truth is more complex, and depends considerably on the parameters of the 
problem. This property arises due to the consideration of preference value of a flight in the 
allocation mechanisms. Due to this, airlines might be motivated to express their true priority of 
flights, as their high priority flights are almost ensured a slot and their low priority flights are 
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Preference distribution among rerouted flights
Max queue = 6




7.3. Comparison of allocation schemes by participants: 
It is not only important that an allocation method reduces total system delay; it is also vital to 
see its impact on each participant, especially since CTOP falls under the CDM paradigm. The 
equity factor also cannot be addressed collectively for a system; it needs to be addressed for 
each participant. From the airline perspective, the CTOP decision process could be considered 
complex because there are many unknown variables to plan its best possible group of TOS 
messages, e.g., amount of captured flights of other airlines, demand and capacity rate of each 
time window, demand of each FCA, strategy used by other airlines to define their TOS, and 
others. Current solutions for this problem are based on greedy methods, minimizing the total 
system cost (system as a whole) based on flight-slot assignment (FAA, 2014; and Kim, 2015). 
The following airlines/flight operators were considered for the analysis, listed by 
airline name and ICAO call sign in parentheses: 
1. United (UAL) 
2. Envoy (ENY) 
3. Republic (RPA) 
4. Executive Jet Management (EJM) 
5. Delta (DAL) 
6. Endeavor Air (FLG) 
7. Southwest (SWA) 
8. Trans States Airlines (LOF) 
 9. American (AAL) 
10. SkyWest Airlines (SKW) 
11. Shuttle America (TCF) 
12. Atlantic Southeast Airlines (ASQ) 




14. Pegasus Elite Aviation (PEG) 
15. Jet Logistics (JLG) 
16. Air Wisconsin (AWI) 
17. Virgin America (VRD) 
18. Jet Blue (JBU) 
19. Frontier Airlines (FFT) 
20. Alaska Airlines (ASA) 
21. Horizon Air Charter (NKT) 
22. Jetall Holdings (JTL) (Canada) 
23. Mesa Airlines (ASH) 
24. PSA Airlines (JIA) 
25. GoJet Airlines (GJS) 
26. XOJET (XOJ) 
27. Sunset Aviation (TWY) 
28. Priority Aviation Company (NKC) 
 
We would like to mention that there were other airlines/flight operators who had their flights 
in our experimental CTOP test case scenario. There were 33 other flight operators who each 
had a flight in the CTOP test case scenario but displaying results for a total of 55 participants 
where more than 65% of the participants displayed a similar property adds to the redundancy 
of the results and makes an unwieldy presentation. These airlines/flight operators were not 
excluded from our experiment; we will simply not be presenting their results here. We believe 
that the 28 listed participants have captured the unique properties displayed by all the 
participants.  
Figure 32 shows the Total delay incurred by the flight operators for the allocation 




allocation reduces the total delay of all the flight operators irrespective of the number of flights 
each have in the test case scenario. 
 




The cumulative delay of flights assigned a slot and flights rerouted are shown in Figure 33. 
The figure shows how the total delay is absorbed among the flights assigned a slot and 
rerouted flights. It can be seen from Figures 32, 33, and 34 that the flight operator Trans States 
Airlines (LOF) is heavily penalized in the allocation scheme RIBPRA, larger than what it 
experienced in CTOP_RBS, which was due to the nature of RIBPRA, whereby it provides a 
significant advantage to flight operators who have a larger percentage of flights over the flight 
operators who have lesser percentage. This nature of RIBPRA was expected, which motivated 
us to refine the allocation scheme, and as a result RIBPRA_E and RIBPRA_RBS were 
developed. The BPRA, RIBPRA_E and RIBPRA_RBS methods reduced the delay 
experienced by Tran State Airlines (LOF) significantly when compared to the amount of delay 
the flight operator experienced under CTOP_RBS and RIBPRA.  Figures 35, 36, and 37 
reiterate this fact. However, the performance superiority of the proposed allocation approaches 











Figure 34: Average delay of flights assigned a slot and rerouted by flight operators 
 
Total preference weighted delay, and the distribution of preference weighted delay among the 




allocation schemes make the allocation of slots to flights and handles the rerouting decision for 
each participant (Figures 35, 36, and 37). Among BPRA, RIBPRA, RIBPRA_E, and 
RIBPRA_RBS, RIBPRA_E does the allocation and rerouting better than the other methods, as 
it significantly reduces the preference weighted delay in comparison to BPRA and 
RIBPRA_RBS. RIBPRA marginally outperforms the RIBPRA_E only for airlines/flight 
operators who have a higher percentage of flights in the test case scenario. RIBPRA_E ensures 
that there is no disparity between the airlines. RIBPRA_E reduces the delay assigned to the 
airlines that have a lower percentage of lights in comparison to RIBPRA (Figure 35, 36, and 
















Figure 37: Average preference weighted delay of flights assigned a slot and rerouted by flight operators 
Recall that another metric that identifies how effectively the allocation processes assigns delay 




and 40 illustrate that the average preference of flights assigned a slot under RIBPRA_E is 
higher than the other allocation methods except for a few airlines (Figure 39) but it is 
important to note that it reroutes the least average preference of rerouted flights for these 

















Figure 40: Average preference of rerouted flights by flight operators 
Equity concerns are always predominant among the airlines in the face of an allocation scheme 




al., 2014; Hoffman et al., 2003; and Cruciol et al., 2015), which reiterates the importance of 
equity metrics. As mentioned in Section 5.4 there are several equity criteria (Wanke et al., 
2006) which can be considered but no one of them is universally accepted. We will be using 
the metric fair share (Pourtaklo and Ball, 2009) as a comparison metric. The fair share of each 
airline/ flight operator is based on the initial arrival time FCA of flights. A flight operator’s 
fair share is interpreted as the number of slots the carrier should receive. Fair share assignment 
meets equity principles such as impartiality, equal treatment of equals, consistency, and 
demand monotonicity. For a detailed description of fair share the reader is referred to 





Figure 41: Comparison of number of flights assigned to airlines allocation approaches and Fair share 
The airlines received more slots under CTOP_RBS than BPRA, RIBPRA, and RIBPRA_RBS 




more flights (Figure 24) since these methods are based on a common principle that by creating 
a small queue, and rerouting a percentage of incoming flights so that the queue does not 
increase in size (maintaining the queue size within a fixed value), thereby reduces the total 
delay. The number of slots received by the airlines under the proposed allocations is close to 
their fair share value (Figures 41 and 45). It is vital to understand that the fair share value 























Figure 45: High level results of RIBPRA_RBS by flight operators 
The flaw in the proposed allocation method RIBPRA is again highlighted here in Figure 43. It 




flights. The number of slots the airlines received under BPRA, RIBPRA_E and RIBPRA_RBS 
is remarkably close (Figures 42, 44, and 45) to the fair share. RIBPRA_E only marginally 
distributes slots better among flight operators when compared to RIBPRA_RBS and BPRA. 
RIBPRA_RBS and BPRA also allocate slot purely based on the initial arrival time (IAT) of 
flights at the FCA, implementing the FCFS principle used in the RBS policy, which is 
considered to be equitable by the FAA and flight operators (Ball et al., 2005; Hoffman et al., 
2005; Ball et al., 2010; Jakobovits et al., 2005; and Burke, 2002). However, the rerouting 





7.4. Varying the maximum queue size (𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥): 
It is easy to see that maximum queue size (𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥) affects the number of flights getting 
rerouted, so changing the 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥 in the proposed approaches will have an effect in the 
performance of the proposed approaches. We vary the maximum queue from 1 to 21 to see its 
impact over the metrics. The number 21 was chosen as the upper limit since it was the 
maximum queue size recorded in the CTOP_RBS allocation. Limiting the maximum queue 
size has a system efficiency and equity trade off, and the maximum queue size also depends on 
the FCA capacity. 
 
Figure 46: Effect of varying max queue size on total delay 
Figures 46 and 47 illustrate the impact of varying the maximum queue size on the total delay. 
When the maximum queue size is set to 1, the total delay is purely due to the flights rerouted 
and the flights assigned a slot receive no delay (Figures 47 and 52). When the maximum queue 
size is 21, the number of flights assigned a slot and rerouted by the proposed allocation 
methods is the same as the CTOP_RBS. However, RIBPRA_E and RIBPRA are more 
efficient in reducing the total delay this is due to the difference in the way the flights are 


























Effect of max queue size on total delay (GDE min)




rerouted based on the preference value (priority order) indicated by their corresponding 
airlines. This to a certain extent reduces the need for slot substitutions and cancellations by the 
airlines due to the fact that there are fewer holes formed in the system (the slots that have no 
flights assigned to them) thereby alleviating the necessity of a compression process to 
optimize the slot allocation. It is important to note here that the above result is only valid if the 
true priority of the flights was conveyed by the preference values assigned by the respective 
airlines. This result shows that the proposed allocation methods are robust in the sense that 
they capture the effect of cancellations, substitutions, and compression within them to some 
extent. This property of RIBPRA and RIBPRA_E could motivate the airlines to provide the 
true priority among its flights. The performance efficiency of BPRA, RIBPRA, RIBPRA_E 
and RIBPRA_RBS is degraded when the maximum queue size is set to a large value (Figure 
46, 47, 54, and 55). It is because the flights are now made to wait for longer period before the 
slot assignment and rerouting mechanisms are initiated.   
 
Figure 47: Effect of varying max queue size on cumulative delay of flights rerouted and assigned a slot 
The effect on total delay and how the delay is split between the flights assigned a slot and 
rerouted as result of varying the 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥 for the proposed allocation methods is shown in 





Figure 48: Effect of varying max queue size on total delay, BPRA 
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Figure 50: Effect of varying max queue size on total delay, RIBPRA_E 
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Figure 52: Number of flights assigned a slot and rerouted by max queue size 
The number of flights assigned a slot and rerouted depends on the 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥 chosen (Figure 52, 
and 53), due to the nature of the allocation mechanism.  The number of rerouted flights 
increases as the 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥 in the allocation methods is decreased.   
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Figure 54: Effect of varying max queue size on preference weighed delay 
 
Figure 55: Effect of varying max queue size on preference weighed delay of flights assigned a slot and 
rerouted 
The impact of varying 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥 among the proposed allocation method is shown in Figures 54 
and 55. The impact of setting 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥 to a large value is felt heavily by BPRA and 
RIBPRA_RBS. The effect on total preference weighted delay, and how the delay is split 
between the flights assigned a slot and rerouted as result of varying the 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥 for the 
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Figure 56: Effect of varying max queue size on preference weighed delay, BPRA 
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Figure 58: Effect of varying max queue size on preference weighed delay, RIBPRA_E 
 


























Total preference weighted delay - RIBPRA_E

























Total preference weighted delay - RIBPRA_RBS





Figure 60: Average preference of flights assigned a slot and rerouted by max queue 
As we vary 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥, the set of flights assigned a slot and rerouted depends on two factors, 
𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥 and the type of allocation method deployed. RIBPRA_E does perform better among 
the proposed allocation methods in assigning slots to the flights that have high preference 
values, irrespective of 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥, except when 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥 is set to zero (Figures 60, 61, and 61). 
 
Figure 61: Average preference of flights assigned a slot by max queue 
It can also be inferred that RIBPRA_E does perform better among the proposed allocation 
methods in rerouting the flights that have low preference values irrespective of 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥, except 









Chapter 8:  Conclusion and Future work 
 
CTOP is the logical progression of GDP and AFP operating in the CDM. It was developed by 
the FAA to combine the capabilities of a GDP and AFP. The advantages of CTOP over the 
traditional TMIs like GDP, GS, and AFPs are unequivocal. There have been concerns from the 
flight operators/airlines about its implementation, and the justification for investments in IT 
infrastructure required, as there have not been enough instances where the FAA has used a 
CTOP to manage the traffic imbalance. Fear of lack of participation from the airlines/flight 
operators and uncertainty about their responses has delayed the FAA from implementing 
CTOP. These differences between the FAA and airlines have led to very few instances where 
CTOP has been used. The concerns about allocation scheme used in the CTOP adds to the 
hesitation from the flight operators/airlines. 
In our test case scenario, we exclusively looked at a situation where the nominal 
capacity of the airspace was reduced by fifty percent, and a single FCA was used. The reduced 
capacity forces the FAA to handle the demand and capacity imbalance situation by initiating a 
TMI, CTOP. CTOP not only assigns the required ground delay to flights but also reroutes to 
balance the demand and capacity. This research was motivated by the high ground delays that 
were experienced by flights and how the rerouting decisions were made in the current 
allocation method used in a CTOP. The flights experienced these high delay values because of 
a pseudo queue that developed due to factoring the adjusted cost value of route options from a 
TOS of a flight in the rerouting decisions. Whenever there is situation where a resource 
becomes constrained, there is bound to be competition among the participants (airlines/flight 
operators) vying for the constrained resource. Misleading information from the flight operators 




operators degrading the system performance, both the performance of the other participants 
and the respective flight operator’s performance. The TOS and RTC information from the 
flight operators likewise did not completely express which were the flights that they would 
prefer to be rerouted, and which they want would not want to be rerouted.  
Traffic management actions based on optimization models are the biggest form of 
uncertainty for the flight operators after uncertainties in capacity and demand due to weather 
forecasts. There has been extensive literature, and numerous optimization models that have 
been proposed historically aimed at achieving system efficiency. Although optimization 
models have been aided by the increased computational speed as a result of latest 
advancements in computing processor power, they represent a black box mechanism. These 
optimization models lack a key criterion to the collaborative routing problem, predictability. 
Predictability is transparency in the procedures employed by traffic managers (Hoffman et al., 
2005). In a collaborative operating environment (CDM) dynamically changing traffic 
management practices and allocation procedures pose huge difficulties for flight operators to 
respond to changing conditions. These include uncertainties in information regarding the 
routes available, which aircraft will be rerouted by traffic managers, and when they will be 
rerouted. 
We proposed four alternative approaches based on the idea that by ensuring a 𝑄_𝑚𝑎𝑥, 
which meant rerouting a small percentage of flights based on the preference value received 
from the flight operators, therefore not merely reduces an individual flight operator’s delay but 
also the total delay incurred to the system. We also developed a model to assign the preference 
value of a flight, along with four different strategies that an airline/flight operator could 




The proposed allocation methods, BPRA, RIBPRA, RIBPRA_E and RIBPRA_RBS, 
performed significantly better than the CTOP_RBS. We tried capturing the cancellations and 
substitutions, and compression processes within the framework of RIBPRA and RIBPRA_E. 
Although the results from RIBPRA and RIBPRA_E provided few indications we did not 
however prove it has the equivalent effect. We leave this as part of a potential future research 
work. 
It is essential to note that CTOP can incorporate multiple FCAs within its framework 
and was built to handle multiple FCAs. Multiple FCAs are usually consecutive FCAs or sub 
FCAs of a large FCA. Although our test case scenario considers only a single FCA case, we 
hope the proposed allocation methods could be adopted to handle multiple FCAs and leave 
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